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Abstract
Grading schemes are an increasingly common method of quality disclosure for public
services. Restaurant grading makes information about food safety practices more readily
available and may reduce the prevalence of foodborne illnesses. However, it may also have
meaningful financial repercussions. Using fine-grained administrative data that tracks food safety
compliance and sales activity for the universe of graded restaurants in New York City and its
bordering counties, we assess the aggregate financial effects from restaurant grading. Results
indicate that the grading policy, after an initial period of adjustment, improves restaurants’ food
safety compliance and reduces fines. While the average effect on revenues for graded
restaurants across the municipality is null, the graded restaurants located geographically closer
to an ungraded regime experience slower growth in revenues. There is also evidence of revenue
convergence across graded and ungraded restaurants in the long-term.
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I.

Introduction
Grading schemes have become a popular way to accessibly and concisely convey the

quality of public services. They are a good example of an information-based policy, which aims
to influence, or “nudge” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009), the user’s behavior in a particular direction
rather than mandating or directly incentivizing it. Municipalities across the U.S. grade the
performance of public schools, street cleanliness is frequently scored and graded, and the
Straphangers Campaign in New York City even produces a “report card” ranking the performance
of each subway train line. One of the more recent grading initiatives applies to restaurants’ food
safety compliance, a policy that has taken hold in cities across the globe (Filion and Powell 2009).
The underlying intuition is clear: the grades succinctly and conspicuously summarize information
on sanitary conditions, by an independent third-party regulator, empowering restaurant goers to
choose safer restaurants, reducing the exposure to foodborne illnesses. However, its reception
has not been uniformly positive: restaurant owners, in particular, have pushed back forcefully
against the policy. Their main concern is over the potential impact on their bottom line. Does it
increase compliance-related costs? Does it help or harm restaurants’ sales? And, more broadly,
what are the financial implications for the municipality? In this paper, we shed light on all of
these questions for the largest municipality with a restaurant-grading regime in the U.S. and
present the first estimates of such a policy’s aggregate financial impacts.
We use fine-grained administrative data that tracks the food safety compliance and sales
activity for the universe of restaurants in New York City (NYC) and its bordering counties, over
multiple years, to assess the broader financial consequences of the restaurant grading policy in
NYC. Results indicate that NYC’s grading policy affected both restaurant sanitary conditions and
1

fines levied. While there appears to be a short period of adjustment, during which trends from
the pre-policy period continue, both initial and final inspection scores (which reflect the number
and severity of food safety violations) eventually decline following the implementation of public
grading. More specifically, initial inspection scores increase by about 2.5 points (about 10% of
the pre-grading mean) upon policy implementation, but then decline at about 1.5 points per
quarter thereafter. Further, fines increase immediately after the start of the grading policy (by
between $65 and $100 per inspection, or about 6% - 10% of the mean fine before grading), but
decline thereafter such that any gain is reversed by the second quarter post-implementation (and
further reduced each quarter after that).
The impacts on sales revenues, however, are less stark. While simple pre-post analyses of
restaurants in New York City indicate positive revenue effects immediately after the policy’s
implementation, this effect reverses when we add control groups of ungraded food and
entertainment establishments. However, when we allow the post-grading effect to vary nonlinearly over time, and account for a long-term convergence of revenues across graded and
ungraded establishments, the initial suppression of revenues for NYC restaurants subject to a
grading regime attenuates. While the difference in revenues is insignificant in the full sample, it
remains highly significant when we narrow in on the part of NYC that borders the suburban
counties without any grading regime. These results suggest that while the average effect on
revenues across the municipality is null, the graded restaurants located geographically closer to
an ungraded regime see smaller increases in revenues.

2

II.

Public Restaurant Grading and Quality Disclosure
There is an established history of government either mandating quality disclosure or

conducting its own inspections, especially when the health or safety of consumers is at issue.
While restaurants have long been inspected and monitored by the government, the results of
those inspections, while publicly available, have not always been readily accessible. The obscurity
of that information creates information asymmetries, whereby the restaurant operator knows
the sanitation conditions inside the establishment and the consumer knows only what is easily
visible on site at the restaurant. Consumers can also be informed by a business’ reputation or
personal experiences related to the establishment’s food safety. These sources are also
imperfect, however, as it is difficult for the consumer to link ex post health symptoms with the
restaurant’s product, especially if the restaurant is infrequently patronized (Dranove and Jin
2010). Without explicit quality disclosure, consumers make decisions about their eating habits
based on incomplete information and the restaurants have fewer incentives to change behaviors
around less discernible sanitation issues. Theory suggests, then, that consumers should be
affected by excess incidents of foodborne illness. Public grading policies aim to address these
information asymmetries (and the subsequent health risks) by making the sanitation inspection
information more readily available to the consumer, in a way that minimizes his/her search costs.
Specifically, the letter grading presents a format that is systematic, easily understood and
comparable, and with a clear ranking or “mapping” of grades onto food-safety ratings (Thaler
and Sunstein 2009; Dranove and Jin 2010). The fact that the rating is mandatory and imposed by
the government, a seemingly objective third-party, also makes the information seem more
consistent and trustworthy than were it to come from the restaurant itself or even a private
3

rating company with either monetary or reputational incentives (Dranove and Jin 2010). In
addition, the posting of the letter grade in plain sight, at the point of purchase, makes the
information particularly salient and minimizes the effort required to gather and process it (Thaler
and Sunstein 2009).
We consider the implications of grading policies on restaurants’ aggregate financial
outcomes, which we understand to be a product of a series of micro-decisions on the part of
consumers. We make the reasonable assumption (supported by conversations with professionals
and officials involved in the grading regime) that in the case of NYC restaurant operating costs
changed in negligible ways; therefore, any response in revenues should capture shifts in
consumer behavior.1 Here, we discuss how, depending on the nature of these micro-decisions,
the aggregate financial effects are theoretically ambiguous. In the most optimistic scenario, the
posting of grades will do two things. First, it will influence existing restaurant consumers to sort
away from the establishments with lower grades and towards those with higher grades. Second,
it will also induce consumers, who did not patronize restaurants before (or at least not as
frequently), to dine out (presumably more so at the establishments with higher grades). The
restaurants will, in turn, adjust sanitary practices to improve compliance and earn higher grades,
either in response to or in expectation of a change in consumer behavior. This suggests that food
safety compliance will improve and sales will increase for the average restaurant.

1

DOHMH claims that the types of actions that lead to violations most frequently are based on
habits and training, and not those requiring capital repairs. They suggested that we were unlikely
to see impacts on capital investments because those were not the type of violations that were
most frequent.
4

We consider this first scenario an optimistic, or upper bound, condition, as the grading
policy’s impact could be dampened in two important ways. First, it could be that no or few new
consumers enter the restaurant market and the grading may simply trigger a re-sorting of existing
restaurant patrons. In that case, food safety compliance may still improve over time, but sales
would, on average, exhibit no or little change, as spending is reallocated from restaurants with
lower grades to those with higher grades. Second, expected outcomes may be minimized if the
new information provided by the posted grades does not alter preconceptions about food safety.
In this case, loyal patrons may prioritize information gathered from their first-hand experiences
with the restaurant over the posted grade and continue their patronage in the same manner as
before. For similar reasons, a restaurant’s broader reputation could lessen the effect of the
information provided by the posted grade (Dranove and Jin 2010; Jin and Leslie 2009). Captive
patrons, such as those without any other dining options nearby, may also not process the posted
grade in the same way. Under these conditions, changes in both food safety compliance and
revenues could be attenuated: the restaurants may be less motivated to invest in improving the
posted grade so that any grade-induced sorting would be less evident in sales activity.

III.

Background
A. New York City’s Restaurant Grading Policy
The NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) has long inspected the

City’s restaurants to ensure proper food safety practices, fining restaurants for violations and
closing restaurants with public health hazards. In the early 2000’s, they introduced a website
where anyone could view the restaurants’ violations. The letter grading policy, which began July
2010, followed the same inspection criteria and scoring system, but started assigning each
5

restaurant a letter grade (A, B, or C) and required restaurants to post the grades near the
restaurant's entrance. These letters are printed in large bold font and are required to be near
eye-level and at the front entrance—passersby can easily discern them, even from across the
street (a sample of a posted grade is shown in Appendix A). DOHMH also added the grades for
each inspection to its website. The stated goal of the public grading law was to improve
restaurant sanitary practices and decrease the incidence of restaurant-attributable foodborne
illness in NYC.
Inspection scores are calculated as the sum of violation points assigned during
inspections. The points for a particular violation depend on the health risk it poses to the public,
and the level of public health risk falls into three categories: public health hazards, critical
violations and general violations. Additional points are added to each violation to reflect the
severity of the violation.2 Points from violations are then aggregated to generate the final
inspection score, with lower scores reflecting more hygienic conditions. The scoring rubric used
after the policy change is exactly the same as that used prior to 2010. Following the policy change,
however, DOHMH translated inspection scores into letter grades as follows: an inspection score
of 13 or below is assigned a grade of A; a score between 14-27 a B; and a score of 28 or higher
are assigned a C.3 That said, if an initial inspection yields a score in the B or C grade range, the
grade is not viewed as final. Instead, the restaurant is inspected again within one month. Thus, a
final grade is assigned either after a re-inspection (for those with initial inspection scores above

2

See NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (2010) for detailed explanation of the
relationship between violation severity and violation points assessed and
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doh/downloads/pdf/rii/blue-book.pdf and Schwartz et a. 2015
for more detail on how DOHMH translates scores into grades.
3 Restaurants can also be temporarily closed if they pose a large public safety risk .
6

13) or at the initial inspection if an A is earned. In addition to determining the publicly posted
grade, the inspection outcome affects the time to the next inspection visit. A restaurants are
visited annually for food safety inspections; B’s are inspected twice a year; and C’s are inspected
three times a year. These inspection visits are unannounced within these known longer intervals.
Restaurants are also given the right to due process. They may challenge their violations
(and, therefore, inspection scores, fines, and grades) at a tribunal administered by an
independent agency, the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH). Cases regarding
violations received during the inspection process are adjudicated by hearing examiners (acting
as judges), typically lawyers hired by OATH. Silver et. al. (2017) find that restaurants earning B
and C grades at inspection are much more likely to have inspection scores reduced (improved)
through the adjudication process in the post-period than they were in the pre-period, resulting
in substantially better grades (Silver, et. al. 2017). These findings suggest that challenging grades
in court is an important tool for restaurants motivated to post A grades in their window.
Restaurants DO have the right to post a placard that reads "Grade Pending" in lieu of posting B
or C grades until they have their case heard at the OATH tribunal; this practice may reduce
consumer certainty about restaurant food safety compliance.
Throughout the study period (both before and after the implementation of restaurant
grading), the type and count of inspection violations determines fines assessed. Fines range from
$200-$2,000 per violation and are assessed at a restaurant's adjudication hearing at the
discretion of a hearing officer.4 It is important to note that after January 18, 2011, restaurants

4

An exception to this is if the grade is accepted and a lower fine is paid by the restaurant
operator.
7

receiving an A grade at inspection were not fined for any inspection violations; therefore A
restaurants do not incur any fines for much of the period following the introduction of the grading
policy.

B. Empirical Literature Review
Grading, as a means of conveying information about the quality of services or goods, is
used in other policy contexts, including public education and health care.5 Impact studies of
public grading largely focus on the effects of the grades themselves and how differentiated
information affects relevant outcomes. In the case of ranking health plans, most studies find that
higher-ranked plans see increases in their market share, but that the ratings have less of an effect
when they are hard to understand or when they do not provide new information to the consumer
(for example, Wedig and Tai-Seale 2002 and Dafny and Dranove 2008). In the case of education,
many districts grade schools on their effectiveness (e.g., improvements in test scores) and make
these grades publicly available. There is some evidence that schools with lower grades have
short-term improvement in aggregate student achievements (Rockoff and Turner, 2010; Winters
and Cowen, 2012) and that the information provided by school grades affects housing prices
above and beyond information provided by test scores (Figlio and Lucas, 2004). In addition,
Hastings and Weinstein (2008) show that parents use mandated information on school quality to
move their children to higher performing schools.
The empirical research on food quality disclosure, and grading in particular, is scarce.
While the mechanisms of disclosure might be similar to other contexts, one could argue that the

5

For a comprehensive review of the literature on quality disclosure see Dranove and Jin 2010.
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magnitude and transient nature of the decision is at a different scale than that related to health
care plans or schools (Ippolito and Mathios 1990). There is a set of studies that assess the impact
of food content disclosure on consumer behavior; these studies find that consumers do
increasingly opt for the “healthier” option when the disclosure of relevant information becomes
mandatory (Ippolito and Mathios 1990; Mathios 2000). These are not instances, however, of a
standardized grading regime; restaurant grading provides such a scenario. Ho (2012) analyzes
publicly available restaurant grading data for NYC, exploring the extent to which inspection
scores in one period predict future scores: he observes that prior scores predict less than 2% of
future grades. Wong et al. (2015) provide new evidence of improved compliance since the
beginning of NYC’s public grading program, and offers survey evidence of the program’s high
approval ratings among New Yorkers. This is consistent with other surveys that have
demonstrated that consumers use public inspection results to inform their dining decisions
(Filion and Powell 2009).
As for impact studies of restaurant grading regimes, there are three. 6 Two studies (Jin
and Leslie, 2003; Simon et al., 2005) focus on the effects of the Los Angeles health inspection
letter grade system, which started requiring posted letter grades in 1998. Jin and Leslie (2003)

6

We do not focus on the incidence of foodborne illness as an outcome of interest. While
important it is extremely difficult to link it to the prevalence and use of posted inspection
grades. Indeed, the correlation between inspection scores and foodborne disease outbreaks is
inconsistent (Filion and Powell 2009) and empirically hard to identify. It relies entirely on
restaurant patrons correctly identifying the foodborne illness and attributing its source, which
is difficult to do for a number of reasons (duration of latency, expectations about food safety,
proclivities towards gastrointestinal symptoms) (Jones and Angulo 2006; Mead et. al. 1999; Fein
et. al. 1995;); moreover, it relies on their reporting the illness, which we know is done
inconsistently (Jones and Angulo 2006 Mead et. al. 1999). For all of these reasons, we focus
instead on food safety compliance and economic impacts (for both the restaurants and
municipal finances).
9

use OLS and difference-in-differences regression analyses to estimate the effect of the Los
Angeles letter grades program on inspection scores, restaurant revenues, and foodborne illness
hospitalizations. They find that posted grades improve restaurant inspection scores, that
restaurant revenues respond to hygiene quality signals (i.e. better grades), and that foodbornedisease hospitalizations decrease in Los Angeles County following the implementation of the
public letter grade program. The study by Simon et. al. (2005) also provides evidence of reduced
hospitalizations due to foodborne illnesses in Los Angeles County, compared to California overall.
Jin and Leslie also suggest that the improvements in health outcomes cannot be explained by
consumption choices alone, but are also likely a result of restaurant hygiene improvements. The
most recent study, by Schwartz et. al. (2015), focuses on the impact of individual grades on
restaurant food inspection compliance and economic activity and finds that a better grade
increases a restaurant’s sales (and associated sales taxes) and decreases the amount of fines
assessed and the probability of the restaurant’s closure. These results are also consistent with
the expectation that public restaurant grading provides new information for consumers’ dining
decisions.

IV.

Data and Measures
Our analytical approach is multi-pronged. We employ several metrics to capture the

grading program’s effect, two different data sets, and alternative identification strategies to
exploit, where possible, more detailed data on the NYC grading program. For NYC only, we use
detailed information on restaurants, including their food-safety compliance (e.g., inspection
scores, posted grades) and sales revenues. These data were pulled in two different ways: for NYC
restaurants only, and again for a larger sample including information on restaurant and other
10

ungraded food and entertainment establishments for NYC and two additional suburban counties
for comparison.

A. NYC Restaurant Grading and Compliance Data
We use data on the restaurant-grading program from the NYC Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), the city agency tasked with administering and monitoring food safety
compliance. These data include restaurant characteristics, zip codes, inspection dates and scores,
adjudication dates, grades assigned, and fines assessed. Restaurant characteristics include
number of seats, number of employees, an indicator for chain restaurant (at least 15 locations
nationwide), and a series of variables indicating cuisine offered, service type, and venue type.7
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the restaurants in our NYC sample. The mean restaurant
has 3.25 final inspections over the study period, employs 6.2 workers and has about 29.6 seats.
Just under 11% of restaurants in the sample are chains.
We use scores assessed at each initial and final inspection to capture food safety
compliance. Importantly, both initial and re-inspections take place without advanced notice and
inspectors are randomly assigned to their visits (and do not come back to the same site for reinspections). Initial scores will reflect the unanticipated response on the part of the restaurants
and the final inspection scores will, to some extent, reflect learning or adjustment by restaurants.
This difference is confirmed in the data (and displayed in Figure 1), where we see a starker shift
in final inspection scores (compared to pre-grading scores) towards lower values; the distribution

7

A full list of cuisine, service, and venue types is available upon request. We use data on
restaurant characteristics recorded at the last inspection only, so these characteristics do not
vary with time. Unfortunately, we cannot access information on restaurant characteristics over
time, as they are not tracked by DOHMH.
11

of initial scores is not identical, but certainly more similar, before and after the implementation
of grading.8
Finally, we use data on fines to assess the program’s public revenue generation (and
conversely, the financial burden on restaurants) – focusing on fines levied. All dollar values are
adjusted using urban CPI to real 2013 dollars.
The NYC grading and compliance data span December 1, 2007 through February 28, 2013,
two and a half years before and after the implementation of public grading (hereafter referred
to as "pre-period" and "post-period", respectively). This sample includes 159,588 initial
inspections and 167,045 final inspections of 41,362 restaurants in all, including 29,864
restaurants operating and graded in the post-period.

B. Sales Revenue and Tax Data
New York City Sample
We obtain reported quarterly sales for all NYC restaurants from the city’s Department of
Finance (NYC DOF).9 Due to statutory restrictions on data sharing, we could not access filer-level
information. Instead, NYC DOF aggregated the data in order to ensure the confidentiality of the

8

This finding, in addition to the fact that inspectors are randomly assigned to restaurants and
do not conduct repeat visits, will help to mitigate against concerns that inspectors are
systematically inflating scores post-grading to achieve higher grades. For a more
comprehensive discussion of this issue in the case of the NYC grading regime, please see
Schwartz et al. 2015.
9 These values are also adjusted to 2013 dollars. NYC restaurants are required to collect sales
tax on food and beverage sales at a rate of 8.875% of gross sales - 4.875% for New York State
and 4.0% for NYC. The State collects the entire sales tax from restaurants and remits the City’s
portion of sales tax revenue in the following month. Restaurants with $300,000 or less of sales
in the previous quarter may remit sales taxes to New York State quarterly, while restaurants
with more than $300,000 of sales in the previous quarter remit monthly to the State.
12

restaurants according to the following protocol: (i) matching DOHMH restaurant data and NYC
DOF sales data using Employer Identification Numbers (EINs), and (ii) aggregating the EIN-level
sales reports into randomly-assigned groups, to create a group-level data set.10 In the resulting
group-level data set, each observation contains summary data for the set of 10 restaurants
randomly assigned to the same group, or “bin”, for each quarter-year in the pre-grading and postgrading periods.11 The data set is a panel of restaurant-groups, each of which can be followed
throughout the study period. The random assignment of the restaurants into the groups
mitigates any bias caused either by geographic clustering of grades or subsequent spillover
effects. The summary statistics for each group-quarter include means and standard deviations of
sales. Our sample for the NYC sales analyses includes 2,288 groups and 24,464 observations.12
New York City, Long Island and Westchester Sample
We construct a control group of establishments, using sales data from the two counties
bordering NYC (Nassau and Westchester) that were never subject to a grading policy during the
study period. Since we required data outside of NYC’s jurisdiction, we needed to coordinate with

10

To address attrition and entry, we stratify the sample by quarters of operation and then
assign restaurants to groups of ten within each strata. Thus, the 5,145 restaurants operating in
all 20 quarters of our study period were randomly assigned to 509 groups of 10 and five groups
of 11; the 149 restaurants operating in all but the last quarter were grouped in five groups of 10
and 9 groups of 11; the 244 operating in all but the first were grouped in 20 groups of 10 and 4
groups of 11. They continue this process, sequentially, until all restaurants are assigned to
groups, homogeneous in their quarters of operation and no group (and no observation) ever
provides information on fewer than ten establishments.
11 A small number of groups have 11 rather than 10 restaurants in order to make sure all
restaurants are included.
12 The policy is implemented in the middle of the 2nd sales tax quarter in 2011. Our NYC analytic
sample includes data observed from the 4th quarter of 2008 to the 3rd quarter of 2013.
13

the State’s Department of Taxation and Finance (NYS DOF).13 This involved a separate data
request, with slightly different grouping parameters (we were subject to the same confidentiality
requirements and had to, again, group the tax filer data into bins of 10). First, we distinguish the
types of food establishments that would be subject to grading from those that earn commercial
revenues (such as grocery stores or entertainment venues) but are never subject to a grading
regime. Unlike the NYC data, we were unable to merge the DOHMH restaurant data directly with
the State’s finance data. We instead identified the subset of NAICS codes that appear among the
graded establishments in DOHMH’s restaurant data and used these to identify the restaurants in
NYC that should be subject to grading; these establishments are henceforth referred to as
“graded” restaurants.14 We then use two comparison groups: (i) suburban establishments with
similar NAICS codes as “graded” restaurants in NYC (henceforth referred to as ungraded
restaurants) and (ii) ungraded food and entertainment establishments (with distinct NAICS codes
than those subject to grading) unlikely to have been graded, in NYC and the suburban counties.
See Appendix B for a detailed breakdown. Second, we grouped the tax filers by their reported
county of operation and type of establishment (i.e. NAICS code), by quarter. Thus, we create a

13

It is important to note that the sales and tax data from NYC’s Department of Finance is
originally sourced from the state data as well. Therefore, the underlying data is the same across
the two samples; the meaningful difference is in how the individual filer data was grouped.
14 This means that we are capturing the universe of food-service establishments that are very
likely (but not definitively) subject to NYC’s grading regime. Therefore, we set up something
akin to an intent-to-treat group rather than a clean treatment group. While this over-inclusion
of “graded” establishments could attenuate our estimates, we mitigate against this by pulling
an identical set of NAICS codes for the comparison establishments in the suburban counties and
conducting a difference-in-difference estimation. In addition, we’ve replicated analyses using
only the subset of NAICS codes that definitively apply to food service and restaurant
establishments (those coded as 722---), which are certainly subject to grading. The results are
substantively the same as those using the full sample of establishments; they are available from
the authors upon request.
14

dataset where the level of observation is the group-quarter and each observation includes the
means and standard deviations of sales. Our sample for the expanded NYC sales analyses includes
1,525,330 group-quarter observations over a the 10-year sample period from 2007-2016. This
includes over 800,000 observations of NYC restaurants that are “graded,” or most likely to be
subject to the grading law based on their NAICS classification.

V.

Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy relies on a difference-in-difference specification, comparing

establishments subject to the grading policy to those exempt from the policy, before and after
the implementation of the policy. For some outcomes, we augment this specification to include
two simultaneous control groups. Restaurants in NYC are continuously inspected (and scored)
throughout the study period, but only after the start of the grading policy are the inspection
results made conspicuous via the posted grade.15 Estimates of the policy effect, therefore,
capture the impact of new information provided through the posted grade.

A. Inspection Scores and Fines
We use inspection scores and fines to measure (i) food safety compliance behaviors, and
(ii) fiscal burdens.16 Fines are also a good measure of the policy’s direct fiscal impact on the City,

15

We know that restaurants in Nassau and Westchester counties are inspected for food safety
compliance and the results of these inspections are made available via
https://health.data.ny.gov.
16 We would also like to estimate changes in the likelihood of restaurant closures, but we are
limited in how precisely we can identify the timing of closure. We identify restaurant closure as
whether or not it is still operating at the time of inspection; since inspections occur irregularly,
we are unable to precisely pinpoint the timing of closure, introducing considerable bias into our
estimates. To address this issue, we would have to exclude all restaurants closing in the year
15

since the new grading regime imposes little or no new costs.17 We begin with a standard prepost model, as follows:
(1)

yit = β0 + Grading_Postit' β1 + Xi' β2 + β3Pre_Postit + γi + δt + εit

Here, y reflects restaurant outcomes, including inspection scores and fines. Grading_Post is a set
of three variables, which capture the implementation of the grading policy: Post, Post_trend and
Post_trend2. Post takes on the value of 0 prior to the start of the grading policy (for t<0) and 1
thereafter (for t>0); the coefficient on Post captures the initial effect of the policy’s
implementation. Post_trend and Post_trend2 are created by interacting Post with linear and
quadratic time trends, and allow the effect to change over time; X is a vector of restaurant
characteristics including cuisine, service, and venue type; Pre_Post is a linear (and, in certain
specifications, nonlinear) time trend; γ and δ are zip code and seasonal fixed effects, respectively;
and ε is an error term. In an alternative model specification, we estimate model (1) controlling
for restaurant fixed effects, μi, instead of γi and Xi.
When grading started, restaurants were not uniformly exposed to the new inspection
regime (i.e. did not have to post a grade until they had a graded inspection following the policy
change). We exploit the variation in grade posting during the roll-out period in an alternative
specification, where we limit the sample to restaurant-quarter observations during the first year
of the policy’s legislative start, or the roll-out period. Here we are comparing the “early posters”
to the “late posters” and this model takes on the following form:
(2) yit = β0 + β1Post_Rolloutit+ X’iβ2 + γi + δt + εit

during which the policy is implemented (approximately 20% of our sample) or during the last
year of the panel (approximately 20% of our sample).
17 This is a reasonable assumption that is corroborated by accounts from DOHMH .
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Again, y is a restaurant-specific outcome (inspection scores and fines) and Post_Rollout takes on
the value of 1 if the restaurant has posted a grade placard by the beginning of the quarter t and
0 otherwise. The remaining variables are identical to those defined above.

B. Sales Revenues
As described above, we compare “graded” NYC restaurants to ungraded restaurants in
the suburban counties and to ungraded food and entertainment establishments in NYC and the
suburban counties.18 We include this third group of establishments, which are never subject to
grading, in order to capture sector-specific trends. Therefore, we end up with the intent-to-treat
group (“graded” restaurants in NYC) and two counterfactuals (ungraded restaurants in the
suburban counties and ungraded food establishments and entertainment venues). We set up a
triple difference-in-difference model, using the grouped sales data. The fully-specified model is
as follows:
(3) 𝑦𝑔𝑞 = 𝑮𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈_𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒈𝒒 ′𝝉𝟏 + 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒈𝒒 ′𝝉𝟐 + 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒕_𝑮𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒈𝒒 ′𝝉𝟑 +
𝜏4 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑔𝑞 + 𝛾𝑐𝑟 + 𝛿𝑞 + 𝜀𝑔𝑞
Here, 𝑦𝑔𝑞 is the group’s average restaurant sales in quarter q. As above, Grading_Post a set of
three variables, Post, Post_trend, and Post_trend2. As above, Post takes on the value of 1 if
quarter q is after the start of the grading policy and 0 otherwise; Post_trend and Post_trend2 are
interactions between Post and linear and quadratic time trends, respectively. We add to this
model a vector, Restaurant, to control for the degree to which establishments are subject to the
NYC grading policy (i.e. NYC “graded” restaurants vs. suburban ungraded restaurants vs.
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Again, a table with the assignment of NAICS codes for grade-able restaurants and ungraded
food establishments and entertainment venues is presented in Appendix B.
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ungraded food and entertainment establishments, the latter of which is omitted as the reference
category). These variables will also help to control for reputational differences across the
different types of establishments. We also include interaction terms, included in Rest_Grading,
whose coefficients capture the post-grading effect on “graded” NYC restaurants and suburban
restaurants relative to ungraded food and entertainment establishments. Therefore, 𝝉𝟑 identifies
the effect from any new information provided by the posted grades, above-and-beyond the
influence of sector, geography or pre-grading reputation. Finally, 𝛾𝑐𝑟 and δq are county-NAICS
and quarter fixed effects, respectively.19 We note that while point estimates are of the mean
impact on restaurants, the standard errors are larger than if we observed individual restaurant
sales. We also cluster the standard errors by county-NAICS to mitigate spatial autocorrelation
across proximate establishments.20
And as above, we also specify an alternative, roll-out model, exploiting the detailed panel
data on sales revenues for NYC graded restaurants alone:
(4) 𝑦𝑔𝑞 = 𝜏1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑔𝑞 + 𝑿′𝒈𝒒 𝝉𝟐 + 𝛾𝑔 + 𝛿𝑞 + 𝜀𝑔𝑞
Where 𝑦𝑔𝑞 is the group’s mean sales in quarter q and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 is the average share of days
in quarter q of posting a grade placard for restaurants in group g. As above, grade placards can
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Specifically, we group observations (and cluster their standard errors) by two-, three- and
four-digit NAICS codes: in case of restaurants (graded and ungraded) we group those coded
772--- and 445--- separately; in the case of ungraded food/entertainment establishments we
group 71----, 4451--, 4452-- and 4453—separately. These groupings are consistent with how the
sales data were processed and grouped. We do replicate these models with less restrictive
geographic controls and the results are substantively the same. The finer spatial controls will
also help in minimizing the effect of reputation on the grading estimates, since consumers are
more likely to be exposed to similar reputational information in closer spatial proximity (Jin and
Leslie 2009).
20 We are less concerned about geographic co-dependence of the inspections themselves, since
inspectors are randomly assigned to restaurants and not on a geographic basis.
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read A, B, C, or Grade Pending, because treatment begins with the first grades assigned at
inspection. Insofar as Grade Pending is an unclear signal to consumers, sales results will be
attenuated to zero. Again, these estimates are consistent -- but inefficient -- as compared to
estimates derived from models run on restaurant-level observations, as described earlier. The
remaining variables are identical to those defined above for the inspection score and fines
models, but aggregated to the group level.

VI.

Results
A. Inspection Scores
We first discuss results from the pre-post analysis, estimating the grading policy’s impact

on the restaurant’s food safety compliance, as measured by inspection scores from 2007-2013.
Table 2 shows initial inspection score results, which provide the strictest test of improved food
safety compliance. Table 3 shows final inspection score results, which test the extent to which
further compliance improvement occurs after poor initial inspection performance.
The first column of Table 2 shows that after the implementation of the grading policy,
initial inspection scores decline (i.e. health conditions improve) by about 1.3 points on average
per inspection. This is about 6% percent of the sample mean in the pre-period. When we include
additional controls, such as seasonal and ZIP fixed effects, restaurant characteristics and a prepost trend line, the coefficient on Post turns positive and decreases slightly in magnitude,
suggesting that compliance improves over time, but does not improve precisely at the time of
policy implementation. The coefficient on Post remains positive and significant when we include
restaurant fixed effects (instead of ZIP fixed effects and time-invariant restaurant characteristics)
19

and then when we include a linear Post_trend. The results from this model indicate that upon
policy implementation initial inspection scores go up by about 1.2 points, but decline over time
by about .33 per quarter, implying that mean initial inspection scores improve starting about one
year after policy implementation. When we add in Post_trend2 in the final column, the magnitude
of the post-grading effect increases to 2.4 and the ensuing change is clearly nonlinear: after the
initial bump up in scores, there is a decline of about 1.5 points per quarter that flattens out over
time. In sum, while the initial effect of the grading policy indicates less compliance, the slope
effect over time indicates that compliance has improved since public grading began. On net, the
overall effect is improved compliance within the first two quarters of implementation that also
continues through the end of the sample period. In general, we note that the other covariates
display generally expected signs: initial inspection scores are lower (better) for chains and
uncorrelated with number of seats and number of workers. There is also variation in scores
depending on cuisine.
Table 3 shows the same models, using final inspection scores. Just as above, the first
column displays a significant and negative coefficient on Post, but much larger in magnitude: final
inspection scores decline by about 7.6 points on average. As we add in controls to the model, the
coefficient on Post remains negative and decreases slightly in magnitude, and in the final,
preferred models, inspection scores decline by about 4 points on average upon implementation
of the grading policy. When we include only the linear Post_trend, scores continue to decline
over time, at about .29 per quarter. The final column includes a nonlinear Post_trend2, and there
is, again, evidence of a nonlinear response over time: initially, scores go down by 5 and continue
to decline (at 1.1 points per quarter), but at a declining rate. Since final inspection scores reflect
20

food safety conditions after feedback or general learning from initial inspections, it is not
surprising that the immediate effect (i.e. the coefficient on Post) is a reduction in scores. Both
initial and final scores decline over time (but at a decreasing rate) after policy implementation,
suggesting improved food safety compliance and ongoing learning on the part of restaurants
during the first six months of the policy. In general, we note that the other covariates display
generally expected signs: final inspection scores are lower (better) for chains and uncorrelated
with the number of workers and number of seats. There is also variation in scores depending on
cuisine and the directions of those relationships are generally consistent with the relationships
observed in the results for initial inspection scores.
As an alternative specification, we exploit the policy’s roll-out period to identify the
impact of posting a grade on inspection scores. One concern with this approach is that the
restaurants exposed earlier to the policy were systematically different than those exposed later.
We assess the differences in early- and late-graded restaurants across a range of observed
restaurant characteristics and sanitary conditions—displayed in Appendix C. In general, we find
no meaningful difference between the early- and late-inspections, and fail to reject the null of
group equivalence in a joint-significance F-test.21 This mitigates some concerns of selection bias,
based on observed characteristics (which we assume are at least somewhat correlated with
unobserved characteristics), and we proceed with the assumption that the roll-out of the
program was random, conditional on the restaurants’ observed characteristics. We also control
for restaurant-level characteristics in the regression models and, in some specifications,
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We also find little or no difference between the sample for the roll-out analysis and the larger
sample for the pre-post analysis.
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restaurant fixed effects for a within-restaurant comparison over time, further reducing
unobserved heterogeneity across early- and late-graded restaurants.
The results for the roll-out regression analysis are displayed in Table 4, and we begin with
the most parsimonious model, controlling for restaurant characteristics and time trends. We
show results for both initial and final inspection score results. Both initial and final scores go
down, although the declines are bigger for the latter measure, which is consistent with the results
from the pre-post sample. Again, this is likely due to some combination of restaurant learning
and improved compliance over somewhat shorter re-inspection windows. In the models with
restaurant fixed effects, initial inspection scores for restaurants exposed to the grading policy
(compared to those not yet exposed) go down by just under 1 point. Similarly, final inspection
scores decline almost 4 points per inspection. We recognize that there could be a period of
adjustment, even during the roll-out period. To test for this, we replicate the roll-out analysis,
allowing the effect of the graded inspection to vary across time. These results are displayed in
Appendix D. The immediate effect of the graded inspection is positive for initial inspections and
negative for final ones; over the course of the roll-out period, this effect progressively becomes
more negative (i.e. scores are improving). Thus, by the end of the first year of the grading policy,
mean initial and final inspection scores are both lower than they were before public grading.
Again, this is consistent with the findings from the pre-post analysis.
Altogether, the results for inspection scores indicate a period of adjustment on the part
of the restaurants, which initially see a slight bump up in initial inspection scores and then a
steady decline over time. The initial increase in scores could mean two things. First, it suggests
that restaurants were changing their food safety compliance behaviors in response to the policy
22

(and the feedback from the inspections), but that it took time for it to manifest itself in the actual
restaurants’ conditions. The initial scores (and therefore food safety conditions) could have been
more reflective of restaurants’ conditions prior to the start of the grade-posting policy, and later
inspection scores a product of their response to the change in policy. This pattern is supported
by the descriptive statistics displayed in Table 5, which also show an improvement (i.e. decline)
in inspection scores as the program progressed. During the period before public grading,
restaurants earned inspection scores of 24.6 on average. In the first five quarters after public
grading, mean final inspection scores improved to 18.2. This initial improvement was driven by
improved compliance during re-inspections, as the initial scores are about level with the preimplementation scores. In the next five quarters, average final inspection scores further
improved to 15.6. This second improvement was driven in part by improved compliance on initial
inspections (which on average went down to 22.2).22
A second explanation for initially increasing and then declining scores relates to inspector
behavior—that they had incentives to improve scores under the new grading regime regardless
of actual food safety compliance. While we cannot test this directly, there are three reasons we
think this mechanism is unlikely (and that any improvement in scores predominantly reflects an
improvement in food safety compliance). First, inspectors are randomly assigned to their site
visits, and therefore restaurants are dealing with different individuals for the initial and reinspections—it is unlikely that the randomly assigned inspector for re-inspection would be
colluding with the initial inspector to systematically reduce final inspection scores, other than
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We find similar changes in mean inspection scores for “continuously operating” restaurants
that operate for two and half years before and two and half years after public grading.
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based on an observed improvement in food safety compliance. Second, conversations with food
safety practice and epidemiological experts at the DOHMH confirm that the same inspection
procedures, rubrics and trainings were used before and after the policy and that inspectors were
trained to maintain the same standards.23 Third, the similar distribution of initial scores, before
and after grading, suggests that any inspector-driven grade inflation was, at worst, minimal.

B. Fines
Next we consider how the grading policy affects fines; this is one potential financial
benefit for the City (and conversely, a financial burden for restaurants). Some claimed that the
policy was an excuse for the City to collect more revenues from inspected establishments; we
test the validity of this claim here. To start, we consider Figure 2, which shows mean restaurant
fines by quarter. While fines per restaurant increase in the year immediately following program
implementation, this extends a pre-existing trend (that temporarily discontinues in the second
quarter of 2011, during program implementation). Quarterly fines reach a peak of $675 per
operating restaurant in the first quarter of 2012 and then decline steadily, reaching pre-program
levels by the third quarter of 2013 ($353 in fines for the average restaurant). The question is
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We recognize that there is selection into which restaurants are re-inspected. The reinspected restaurants get a second draw from the score distribution, which mechanically leads
to score “inflation.” This is not inspectors’ score inflation, but rather the design of the program
(and should still reflect food safety improvement). The new policy did include the hiring of more
inspectors, but there is no evidence to suggest that the new inspectors were more lenient than
the older ones; and again, they were still being randomly assigned to inspections. In addition,
while the higher stakes of the posted grades could change the nature of the interaction
between inspectors and restaurants, it is unlikely that this shift would be so systematic as to
drive the effects we observe.
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whether the post-grading trend is significantly different than what would have continued
otherwise.
Starting with a simple pre-post model in the first column of Table 6, we see that fines
declined after the policy’s implementation. The coefficient on Post is negative and highly
significant and indicates that on average fines went down by $271 per inspection. When we add
in restaurant controls, a linear time trend, and ZIP and seasonal fixed effects, the magnitude on
the Post coefficient goes down substantially, but still remains negative: fines reduced by about
$62 per inspection after the grading policy’s implementation. When we instead rely on restaurant
fixed effects, the coefficient on Post flips its sign to positive, suggesting that fines decline over
time, but the decline does not coincide with the precise timing of the policy change. In the final
columns of Table 6, our preferred models show that upon policy implementation, fines increase
(by about $65 or $110 per inspection, depending on whether or not a nonlinear post-trend is
included), but they decline precipitously (and linearly) over time, such that by the second quarter
after implementation any increase in fines had been reversed. This immediate increase in fines
is consistent with the short-term increase in initial inspection scores, which also goes down over
the first year of the policy. Again, this suggests learning and adjustments on the part of
restaurants. Altogether, these results suggest that the grading policy did not increase fine-driven
revenues for the City, which initially increase but drop during the first six months and end up
lower than before the policy change.
Again, we repeat the analysis using the roll-out sample, comparing those restaurants that
were exposed to the grading regime earlier in the rollout period to those that were exposed later.
The first column of Table 7 displays the results for the model without restaurant fixed effects;
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those restaurants exposed earlier to the grading regime pay higher fines on average than those
exposed later—about $44 more per inspection. We then add in restaurant fixed effects so that
we can compare fines within restaurants, and the magnitude of the coefficient on Post_Rollout
goes down and flips to a negative sign. Therefore, in our preferred model, we estimate fines
decline $31 per quarter during the first year of the policy. This decline is consistent with that
observed in the larger pre-post sample, which also produced fine declines over the course of the
initial year.

C. Falsification Tests for Inspection Score and Fines
For the pre-post analyses on inspection scores and fines, we implement a placebo test to
assess the timing of level and slope changes relative to the grading policy’s implementation. To
do this, we replicate the estimation, assigning a placebo policy start date one year prior to the
actual policy start date. We find that the program was already being discussed in the popular
press one year prior to the program’s actual start, and so we use this date. The results from this
analysis are displayed in Table 8.24
In the case of initial and final scores, we see that the false start date is associated with an
immediate decline in scores (which is statistically insignificant for final scores), but a large
increase in the three quarters thereafter. Thus, inspection scores are actually worse overall in the
period immediately preceding policy implementation than would be detected with a simple
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We run more parsimonious models, including only Post_false and Post_trend_false, but for
purposes of brevity we display only the more comprehensive models since they better control
for all the possible points of inflection during the pre- and post-grading regimes. We further
specify models with quadratic and cubic time trends, finding similar results, which are available
upon request of the authors.
26

linear trend-line. The true policy start date (while still controlling for the false start date) is
associated with statistically significant declines for both initial and final scores (the latter one
about ten times larger), and then a continued decline over the post-period. The discontinuity in
intercept and reversal in slope both suggest that any decline in inspection scores is in fact
associated with the grade posting and not a continuation of a prior trend or expectation.
For fines, we conduct the same test and see that the false start date is associated with an
increase in fines and a positive slope thereafter. The actual policy start date, however, indicates
a drop in fines and a subsequent decline (that rather quickly reverses any prior increase in fines).
Again, this reversal suggests that any initial bump up in fines (as observed in the pre-post analysis)
could be driven by trends prior to the actual start date, and that the grading policy itself is
associated with a drop in fines.

D. Sales Revenues
We now turn to our broader sample, which includes NYC, Westchester and Nassau
counties for 2007-2016. Again, as a starting point, we look at unadjusted trends over the course
of the study period. Figure 3 shows mean sales by quarter for the 14 quarters before public
grading and the 26 quarters after, stratified by exposure to grading and location. We see that
mean sales follow parallel trends for “graded” NYC restaurants and ungraded suburban
restaurants before the implementation of the grading policy in mid-2010; there is, however, a
slight divergence immediately after the policy starts, and then a re-convergence in the second
half of 2014. We also note that mean sales for suburban ungraded food and entertainment
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establishments exhibit more volatility than those for the restaurants, and are consistently higher
than those for similarly classified establishments in NYC.
To test the extent to which this trend persists in the presence of restaurant, geographic
and temporal controls, we consider the regression results in Tables 9 and 10, which display the
results for the pre-post and difference-in-difference models. The first column of Table 9 shows a
simple pre-post model, on only the sample of the NYC food establishments subject to the grading
policy (the “graded restaurants”). Controlling only for county and seasonal variation, we see that,
after the policy started, restaurants witnessed an increase in sales revenues of nearly $10,000.25
Without a control group of ungraded establishments, it is unclear whether or not this increase in
revenues is due to the new grading regime or to trends that would have continued even in the
absence of the policy. Therefore, in the second column, we add in a control group of ungraded
establishments (including food and entertainment services, still in NYC only) and estimate a
difference-in-difference. The coefficient on Restaurant_Grading is our impact estimate of
interest, and it is negative and statistically insignificant. Compared to food and entertainment
establishments that were not subject to grading, “graded” restaurants saw no significant change
in revenues after the policy’s implementation. We also note that the coefficient on Restaurant is
positive and significant (albeit marginally), which captures, at least in part, pre-grading
differences (between “graded” restaurants and ungraded establishments in NYC).
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This finding is consistent with what we find when running a similar model on the panel of
grouped NYC restaurants. For that sample, we find that revenues increase between $8,000 and
$10,700, depending on the specification. These results are available from the authors upon
request.
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One concern with the current difference-in-difference estimate is that we do not have
the right counterfactual, since the ungraded food and entertainment establishments could be
subject to different macroeconomic trends than those for the “graded” restaurants. In addition,
the estimates of Restaurant_Grading could be biased by cross-contamination of the grading
effect onto un-graded establishments. Specifically, the posted grades on certain establishments
could shift consumers’ general assessment and internalization of hygiene for all kinds of food and
entertainment establishments. Therefore, we expand our sample to include counties bordering
NYC that were not exposed to any grading regime, but were arguably subject to similar regional
trends and shocks.
In the final column of Table 9, we use the sample including NYC and bordering suburban
counties, but retain only restaurants. This model compares revenue outcomes for NYC “graded”
restaurants against those for ungraded restaurants in Nassau and Westchester counties. While
the coefficient on Restaurant_Grading turns positive, it remains insignificant. Altogether, these
findings suggest two things: first, the selection of the control group matters (as indicated by the
change in signs), and, second, compared to a range of reasonably similar establishments, the
graded restaurants did not experience any significant revenue changes after the implementation
of the grading policy.
For the next set of results (displayed in Table 10), we include a second counterfactual. We
specify the model as a triple difference-in-difference, where graded NYC restaurants are
compared to both similarly classified ungraded restaurants in Westchester and Nassau counties
and to ungraded food and entertainment establishments in the NYC and suburban counties. We
start with a model that is otherwise similarly specified as the one for the NYC difference-in29

difference. The new variables of interest are NYC_Rest_Graded and Suburb_Rest_Graded, and
their coefficients capture the effect of the grading policy on revenues, relative to ungraded food
and entertainment establishments. In the first column, the change in revenues for graded
restaurants in NYC is not statistically different from that for ungraded food and entertainment
establishments (as indicated by the insignificant coefficient on NYC_Rest_Graded); a t-test
against the coefficient on Suburb_Rest_Graded indicates that their difference is not statistically
significant either. In the second column of Table 10 we add in county-specific time trends and
control for a linear trend in revenues (both before and after the implementation of the grading
regime). First, we see that the magnitudes on the NYC_Rest_Graded and Suburb_Rest_Graded
coefficients increase substantially, suggesting that there is county-specific variation over time
that was pushing those estimates down. Second, the post-grading effect on NYC restaurants is
still positive and insignificant (relative to the ungraded food and entertainment establishments).
Finally, the coefficient on NYC_Rest_Graded is statistically different than that on
Suburb_Rest_Graded, suggesting that, on average, “graded” restaurants in NYC experienced a
relatively smaller increase in revenues compared to similarly classified restaurants in the
suburban counties that were not subject to grading. The fact that this difference is significant,
while the difference with ungraded food and entertainment establishments is not, adds credence
to a grading-induced suppression of sales. Moreover, this suppression is substantively
meaningful at about $16,500, or 8-10% of the typical restaurant’s revenues in the sample.
We

now

turn

to

a

second

set

of

estimates,

NYC_Rest_Posttrend

and

Suburb_Rest_Posttrend, which allow the grading effect to vary linearly over time. While NYC
“graded” restaurants see a significant increase in revenues over time relative to non-food
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entertainment establishments, there is no significant difference in the post-trends between NYC
and Suburban restaurants; this suggests that, when we assume a linear trend for the six years
after the implementation of the grading policy, the initial difference in revenues is sustained.26
Finally, we estimate the impact using a model that allows the post-grading effect to vary
non-linearly over time (displayed in the third column of Table 10). A number of the findings
change. First, the magnitude of the effect declines substantially for “graded” NYC restaurants
relative to ungraded suburban restaurants (to about $2,000). Second, and more importantly, this
difference is no longer statistically significant (although the difference, relative to ungraded food
and entertainment establishments, becomes significant). In addition, while there is no statistical
difference in the linear post-grading trends for sales, the nonlinear post-trend for the “graded”
NYC restaurants is significantly different from that for the ungraded suburban restaurants. Both
linear trends flatten out over time (more so for suburban restaurant sales), which results in the
convergence of sales that was initially evident in Figure 3. Therefore, any immediate response in
revenues is muted when we account for nonlinear revenue adjustments over the longer term.27
We test for the robustness of these findings in two ways. First, in order to narrow the
comparison space, we restrict the sample to the counties in NYC that are adjacent to the
suburban counties. It is conceivable that micro-regional shocks to the consumption or operation
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We check whether or not our estimates are influenced by a change in the composition of
establishments over time (and specifically a higher likelihood of closure among “graded” NYC
restaurants), and we see no evidence of this in the data. In fact, we see a slightly higher growth
in establishments in the “graded” NYC group. See Appendix E for a visual.
27 This finding is consistent with reports from officials at DOHMH, who observe an increasing
number of “A” grades over time, such that the value-added of the posted food safety
information could disappear over time.
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of restaurants could still bias the estimates, and this specification will better control for such a
threat. In addition, it is plausible that the spatially proximate communities on either side of the
NYC border are more similar. These results are displayed in the final column of Table 10. The
results are consistent with those from the full sample: while revenues grow across the board, the
increase is relatively smaller for “graded” NYC restaurants compared to ungraded suburban
restaurants. The magnitude of the difference is smaller, about $9,250 (about 10 percent of the
mean sales for restaurants in the sample), but remains statistically significant in the presence of
non-linear trends.28 This finding suggests that consumers could be sorting away from the graded
restaurants in NYC to those across the border in Nassau and Westchester counties (restaurants
across the border could also be adjusting their behavior to signal better hygiene); for the citywide
sample, consumers could also be sorting away from lower graded restaurants to higher graded
ones within NYC, which would result in the neutral fiscal effect that we observe.
Second, we estimate a roll-out model on the panel of NYC-only restaurants; these results
are displayed in Table 11. In the fully specified model (i.e. with group fixed effects), the coefficient
on Post is negative and statistically insignificant. These results suggest that within the first year
of the program, there was no significant revenue effect on those exposed earlier to the grading
regime compared to those exposed later.29 However, the sign on the grading impact coefficient
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One might also expect some cross-border contamination, if consumers are now internalizing
restaurant food safety signals differently or if ungraded restaurants in the suburban counties
change their behaviors to respond to an increased awareness around food safety. We exclude the
NYC counties that are geographically proximate to the suburban counties (retaining only
Manhattan, Brooklyn and Staten Island in the NYC sub-sample) and re-run identical
specifications. The results remain substantively the same.
29 We also tested for differential revenue effects across the roll-out period, but none of these
results were statistically significant. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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is negative, which is consistent with the findings from the triple difference-in-difference models
where the increase in revenues for graded NYC restaurants was smaller than that for ungraded
suburban restaurants. The lack of significance for this estimate can be explained in two ways.
First, it is possible that we lose power, and therefore precision, in our reduced-sample estimation.
Second, it could also reflect a lack of clear information to consumers in the first months of the
policy. Among early exposed restaurants, only those earning A’s posted grades in the first couple
of months post-grading (due to timing of grade posting requirements in the inspection cycle).
The time between initial inspection and re-inspection is 2 to 4 weeks and between re-inspection
and adjudication, between 4 to 6 weeks; treated restaurants could post nothing during the first
window and Grade Pending during the second window if they did not earn an A initially. It is not
clear whether or not this distinction was meaningful enough to influence dining choices, and
therefore revenues, during the initial months of the policy.

VII.

Conclusion
Cities have long inspected restaurants for their sanitary conditions, but the public

disclosure of that information for consumers to incorporate into dining decisions is a relatively
new phenomenon. The motivation for a restaurant grading policy is to make the sanitary
conditions of a establishment more transparent and easily understood as a means of reducing
the incidence of foodborne illnesses. Therefore, it is very much a health policy. However, if theory
is correct, and consumers use this information to change their behaviors, restaurants (and the
municipal fisc) could bear economic repercussions as well.
We systematically test these predictions using a collection of rich data on restaurants’
food safety compliance and sales activities in NYC and neighboring counties, both before and
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after the implementation of NYC’s grading policy. Our results suggest that NYC’s restaurant
grading policy, after an initial adjustment period, improves sanitary conditions (as measured by
inspection scores) and reduces public revenues collected through fines.
The impact on sales revenues, however, is more nuanced. For restaurants in NYC overall,
revenues go up following the policy (as they do for other kinds of establishments), but to a lesser
degree than restaurants not subject to a grading regime. This suppressed revenue growth,
however, goes away once we account for nonlinear trends in revenues over time. Furthermore,
models that estimate effects during the policy’s roll-out year show no significant revenue change
for restaurants that are first exposed to the grading regime, compared to those that are later
exposed (although the sign of the effect still does indicate smaller revenues). Finally, when we
restrict the sample to only those NYC counties that border the suburban counties, the relatively
slower growth in revenues for NYC “graded” restaurants (compared to ungraded restaurants
outside of the city) is both statistically and financially meaningful. This suggests that consumers
are perhaps substituting away from the graded restaurants towards those without grades,
favoring lack of information on food safety over explicit information on poor hygiene.
Restaurants in the ungraded regime might be adjusting their practices as well, to signal better
food safety. While not significant, the signs and magnitudes of the trends over time echo those
from the full-sample analysis, suggesting a similar convergence in revenues in these border
counties.
The health goals, as they relate to the restaurant’s food safety compliance, do seem to be
addressed through the improvement of inspection scores. And the fiscal effects are neutral for
the city overall, neither improving nor depressing restaurants’ revenues (and the taxes they in
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turn generate). In addition, violation fines decline. However, these outcomes were not achieved
immediately; the results consistently show that there is a period of adjustment, but one that does
not last longer than six months. This makes sense, as consumers need to internalize the new
information provided by the grades and the businesses need to then respond in their operations.
Further, while a reduction in fines can be a boon to businesses (assuming their compliance costs
do not exceed the savings in fines), it constitutes a revenue reduction for the City. According to
our preferred estimates (and using the more conservative number of initial inspections only), this
fiscal loss amounts to about $1.2 million for a typical fiscal quarter for the municipality, in
addition to any increased administrative costs for running the program (which are estimated to
be somewhere between $245 and $320 per inspection, averaging approximately $2.3 million in
total annually to the City30). The magnitude of these costs relative to the potential benefits,
however, is not entirely obvious without considering the potential health care savings from
reduced incidences of foodborne illnesses.
Apart from the City’s overall welfare, we should also be concerned about the
distributional effects of such a policy. While the current analysis obscures any variation across
restaurants over time, related papers (using NYC and Los Angeles data) find that there are
meaningful differences in economic performance across restaurants with different grades:
restaurants that post As are less likely to close, owe fewer fines and bring in more revenues

30

The average cost per inspection is calculated by dividing all spending in DOHMH’s Food Safety
budget by the reported number of actual restaurant inspections. Budget figures come from
OMB Budget Function Analysis, and actual inspections come from DOHMH reporting to OMB.
One reason costs may rise is that the City had to hire and train additional inspectors to
implement increased use of reinspections.
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compared to B restaurants (Schwartz et. al. 2015; Jin and Leslie 2003). Therefore, the relative
benefits and burdens of the policy differ across restaurants. Certain restaurants may be able to
more easily absorb the costs of managing higher stakes inspections and will likely benefit more
from improved compliance. Likewise, depending on how these restaurants cluster across space,
neighborhoods within cities could be differentially affected by the policy. Our border analysis
suggests that this indeed could be the case.
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Table 1. Restaurant Descriptive Statistics, New York City Sample

Number
Inspections
Final Inspections
Workers
Seats
Cuisine
American
Chinese
Pizza
Latin
Café/Coffee/Tea
Others
Missing
Service
Takeout-Limited Eat in
Wait Service
Wait and Counter
Service
Takeout Only
Counter Service
Others
Missing

Chain

Pre-Public
Grading

Post-Public
Grading

3.3
3.3
6.5
29.6

6.2
3.2
6.7
29.5

0.22
0.09
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.38
0.20
1.00

0.24
0.11
0.06
0.04
0.04
0.51
0.00
1.00

0.35
0.15
0.11

0.39
0.18
0.17

0.08
0.07
0.06
0.20
1.00

0.08
0.12
0.07
0.00
1.00

0.10

0.10

Annual Closure Rate
0.16
0.12
N
30,405
34,917
Notes: Inspections include initial and re-inspections. Final inspections
include all inspections in the pre-period, initial A inspections in the
post-period, and re-inspections for those initially receiving B or C in the
post-period. Workers, seats, cuisine, service, and chain reflect restaurant
characteristics at the most recent restaurant inspection and are
time-invariant variables. Annual closure rate is the fraction of open
restaurants closing each year.
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Table 2. Regression Results, Impact on Initial Inspection Scores, Pre-Post Estimation
VARIABLES
Post
Post*Linear Trend

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-1.33***
(0.09)
__

1.21***
(0.17)
__

2.41***
(0.20)
__

1.23***
(0.20)
-0.33***
(0.04)

__

-0.22***
(0.01)

-0.28***
(0.02)

-0.10***
(0.03)

2.44***
(0.34)
-1.46***
(0.14)
-.03*
(0.01)
0.55***
(0.10)
.07***
(0.01)

N
N
N

Y
Y
N

Y
N
Y

Y
N
Y

Y
N
Y

24.15***
(0.07)

16.10***
(4.16)

22.68***
(0.13)

23.40***
(0.16)

24.41***
(0.22)

Post*Linear Trend2
Linear Trend
Linear Trend2

Seasonal FE
Rest. Char.
Restaurant FE
Constant

Inspections
159588
159588
116228
116228
116228
Restaurants
41362
41362
20641
20641
20641
R-squared
0.00
0.06
0.30
0.30
0.30
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by restaurant in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3. Regression Results, Impact on Final Inspection Scores, Pre-Post Estimation
VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-7.62***
(0.08)
__

-5.08***
(0.16)
__

-4.25***
(0.18)
__

-4.05***
(0.18)
-0.29***
(0.03)

__

-0.20***
(0.01)

-0.18***
(0.02)

-0.05*
(0.03)

-4.94***
(0.29)
-1.10***
(0.12)
-.07***
(0.01)
.68***
(0.09)
.08***
(0.01)

N
N
N

Y
Y
N

Y
N
Y

Y
N
Y

Y
N
Y

24.55***
(0.07)

13.27***
(2.33)

22.57***
(0.12)

23.12***
(0.14)

24.18***
(0.19)

Inspections
167,045
167,045
125,036
125,036
Restaurants
40,554
40,554
20,634
20,634
R-squared
0.06
0.11
0.31
0.31
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by restaurant in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

125,036
20,633
0.31

Post
Post*Linear Trend
Post*Linear Trend2
Linear Trend
Linear Trend2

Seasonal FE
Rest. Char.
Restaurant FE
Constant
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Table 4. Regression Results, Impact on Inspection Scores, Rollout Estimation
Initial Inspection
Score
VARIABLES
Graded Inspection

(1)

(2)

Final Inspection Score

(3)

(4)

-3.553*** -0.949***
(0.184)
(0.159)

-3.382*** -3.778***
(0.181)
(0.160)

0.696***
(0.054)
0.543***
(0.091)
0.635***
(0.112)

0.379***
(0.053)
-0.071
(0.066)
0.334***
(0.073)

1.217***
(0.071)
0.574***
(0.123)
0.756***
(0.150)

1.573***
(0.070)
1.233***
(0.093)
2.051***
(0.113)

Restaurant FE

N

Y

N

Y

Constant

25.981*** 25.536***
(0.109)
(0.059)

Quarter Of Grading Policy
2
3
4

20.219*** 19.791***
(0.099)
(0.066)

Observations
122,886
122,886
93,788
93,788
R-squared
0.007
0.848
0.011
0.763
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5. Inspection Scores and Count of Inspections by Treatment Period, Pre-Post Sample
Inspections:
All Operating
Restaurants
25.07
(76,231)

Inspections:
Continuously
Operating
Restaurants
23.50
(29,804)

25.31
(41,933)

24.26
(17,723)

Final Inspection Score 21.87
(27,874)

20.88
(11,743)

Initial

21.62
(18,409)

Pre
Quarters
Post
1-5

6-10

Initial

22.46
(46,180)

Final Inspection Score 19.52
18.78
(29,135)
(11,544)
Includes pre-adjudicated inspection scores. Mean score shown on top; number of inspections
shown parenthetically. Final Inspection Score is the mean restaurant inspection score for final
inspections each cycle (all A-graded initial inspections and re-inspections of restaurants that
do not get an A grade on initial inspection). Continuously Operating Restaurants are open for
every quarter of the sample period.
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Table 6. Regression Results, Impact on Inspection Fines, Pre-Post Estimation
VARIABLES
Post
Post*Linear Trend

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-270.72***
(5.77)
__

-61.59***
(10.79)
__

88.67***
(10.54)
__

65.26***
(10.52)
-55.98***
(1.84)

__

-14.35***
(0.87)

-22.16***
(0.89)

11.10***
(1.45)

110.57***
(16.51)
-131.17***
(7.01)
0.77
(0.67)
42.24***
-5
3.34***
(0.49)

N
N
N

Y
Y
N

Y
N
Y

Y
N
Y

1,141.52***

245.74*

(5.03)

(137.72)

Post*Linear Trend2
Linear Trend
Linear Trend2

Seasonal FE
Rest. Char.
Restaurant FE
Constant

947.74*** 1,081.79***
(7.04)

(8.44)

Inspections
233,642
233,642
172,098
172,098
Restaurants
41,362
41,362
20,641
20,641
R-squared
0.01
0.05
0.28
0.29
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by restaurant in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Y
N
Y
1,132.0***
(11.44)
172,098
20,640
0.29
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Table 7. Regression Results, Impact on Fines by Quarter, Rollout Estimation
VARIABLES
Graded Inspection
Quarter Of Grading Policy
2
3
4

Restaurant FE
Constant

(1)

(2)

50.918*** -132.357***
(10.547)
(13.919)
95.591*** 163.405***
(9.496)
(10.108)
102.872*** 235.971***
(12.863)
(15.448)
99.762*** 279.118***
(11.105)
(15.132)
N

Y

358.596*** 333.149***
(5.546)
(5.741)

Observations
94,752
94,752
R-squared
0.003
0.551
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8. Falsification Test, Inspection Scores, Fines, Revenues, and Sales Taxes, Pre-Post With 1 Year Lead
VARIABLES
Policy Start
Post
Post*Linear Trend
One Year Before
Post
Post*Linear Trend
Linear Trend

Seasonal FE
Restaurant/Group
FE
Constant

Initial Score

Final Score

Fines

-0.64**
(0.31)
-1.38***
(0.13)

-6.76***
(0.27)
-1.27***
(0.12)

-138.92***
(15.86)
-98.96***
(7.01)

-0.76**
(0.38)
1.30***
(0.14)
-0.34***
(0.06)

-0.43
(0.33)
1.27***
(0.12)
-0.34***
(0.05)

88.83***
(20.04)
53.91***
(7.37)
-0.32
(2.85)

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

23.15***
(0.18)

22.59***
(0.15)

989.98***
(9.39)

Inspections
109,197
120,261
159,617
Restaurants
20,480
20,482
20,485
Observations
---Rest-Quarters
---R-squared
0.31
0.32
0.32
Robust standard errors clustered by restaurant in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9. Regression Results, Impact on Sales by Quarter, Difference-in-Difference
VARIABLES
Grading_Post

(1)

(2)

(3)

9,888.22*
(4855.19)

11,466.94
(6658.48)
56,691.90*
-27,931.33
(2363.78)
(7706.71)

6,324.63
(5824.01)

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

346,500.53***
(21612.73)

269,051.04***
(48250.49)

345,939.48***
(21331.12)

Restaurant
Rest_Grading

Seasonal FE
County FE
Constant

3494.83
(7518.35)

Observations
804,053
1,212,558
1,019,032
R-squared
0.034
0.022
0.012
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by county-NAICS in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10. Regression Results, Impact on Sales by Quarter, Triple Difference-in-Difference
VARIABLES
Grading_Post
Restaurant_NYC
Restaurant_Suburbs
NYC_Rest_Graded
Suburb_Rest_Graded
NYC_Rest_Post_trend

(1)
1,323.71
(10427.72)
48,765.38
(28799.77)
-36,580.01
(26055.05)
10,337.39
(11294.69)
7631.83
(11799.32)

(2)

(3)

(4)

21,983.01
(15931.95)
38,453.69**
(15886.70)
3,312.77**
(1333.45)

17,385.42**
(7110.68)
19,561.50***
(3359.05)
-1,367.26
(5333.27)
-38.64
(215.39)
4802.69
(4116.35)
-589.92
(395.07)
8439.84
(7081.94)
-316.31
(234.99)
-319.55
(4053.26)
134.92
(243.21)
2727.12
(2755.09)
308.08
(237.58)
123,895.66**
(53081.06)
-138,909.01***
(50013.71)
-135,430.95**
(49987.64)
-111,412.13**
(49986.32)
-96,525.94*
(50334.91)

15,224.04**
(5194.44)
24,479.21***
(4959.45)
-4,416.55
(9054.88)
-315.33
(343.78)
790.47
(5342.32)
-712.36
(542.78)
6468.87
(7000.81)
-277.33
(232.54)
3132.46
(6528.92)
388.66
(433.32)
5306.53
(5701.21)
483.36
(434.71)

NYC_Rest_Post_trend2
Suburb_Rest_Post_trend

3452.09
(2160.76)

Suburb_Rest_Post_trend2
NYC_Post_trend

714.01
(1856.84)

NYC_Post_trend2
NYC_Rest_Prepost_trend

-2,981.61**
(1225.03)

NYC_Rest_Prepost_trend2
Suburb_Rest_Prepost_trend

-1,658.54
(1646.23)

Suburb_Rest_Prepost_trend2
Manhattan_Restaurant
Bronx_Restaurant
Brooklyn_Restaurant
Queens_Restaurant
StatenIsland_Restaurant

113,435.91**
(55067.07)
-149,372.11***
(51053.85)
-145,897.73***
(50979.06)
-121,880.45**
(50889.46)
-106,994.04**
(51415.43)

(24061.85)
(17127.22)

3505.30
(14586.02)
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VARIABLES
Nassau_Restaurant

(1)

(3)
3,152.55
(49038.05)
-67,317.25
(49662.37)
-153,650.87***
(49786.72)
-146,649.53***
(49497.41)
-112,264.42**
(50404.59)
-118,814.04**
(49402.34)
65,340.53
(51776.35)
9,078.67
(81036.46)
N
N
Y
Y

(4)
111,873.41***
(13238.04)
41,401.11**
(15272.96)
-41,501.26***
(11508.28)

Y
Y
N
N

(2)
-16,768.20
(50521.79)
-87,245.35*
(51056.07)
-153,607.40***
(49767.62)
-146,622.67***
(49482.83)
-112,248.91**
(50391.71)
-118,834.21**
(49398.97)
49,691.02
(51234.38)
-6,561.37
(78110.87)
N
N
Y
Y

276,225.43***
(49067.64)
1,525,330
0.01

207,073.21***
(55060.56)
1,525,330
0.01

186,436.26***
(57007.36)
1,525,330
0.01

79,800.24**
(27852.27)
780,910
0.002

Westchester_Restaurant
Bronx_Ungraded
Brooklyn_Ungraded
Queens_Ungraded
StatenIsland_Ungraded
Nassau_Ungraded
Westchester_Ungraded
Seasonal FE
County FE
Quarter FE
County trend
Constant
Observations
R-squared

170,850.48***
(20752.49)
114590.59
(66472.72)
N
N
Y
Y
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Table 11. Regression Results, Impact on Sales by Quarter, Food and Beverage Rollout Sample
VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

Graded Inspection

31,552.417
(39,710.175)

-4,485.497
(6,686.311)

-7,763.466
(10,710.803)
-26,199.939
(23,558.118)
-16,070.555
(31,101.395)

1,866.532
(2,298.146)
-4,923.041
(4,723.712)
11,821.031**
*
(5,603.230)

Group FE

N

Y

Constant

212,102.946*
**
(5,506.497)

212,970.365*
**
(1,023.340)

Observations
Restaurant-Quarters
R-squared

3800
39,188
0.002

3800
39,188
0.981

Quarter Of Grading
Policy
2
3
4

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by group in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 1: Distribution of inspection scores
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Figure 2. Average Fines by Quarter, Operating Restaurants
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Figure 3. Average Sales, By Graded and Ungraded Establishments
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Appendix A. Sample Posted B Grade
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Appendix B. NAICS Codes for Establishment Groupings
"Graded" NYC Restaurants
NAICS

Business/Service
Food Services and Drinking
722--Places
All Other Specialty Food
445299 Stores
445291 Baked Goods Stores
445120 Convenience Stores

Ungraded Food and Entertainment
Establishments

Ungraded Suburban Restaurants
NAICS

445299
445291

Business/Service
Food Services and
Drinking Places
All Other Specialty Food
Stores
Baked Goods Stores

445120

Convenience Stores

722---

NAICS

Business/Service

4451--* Grocery Stores
4452--* Specialty Food Stores
4453-- Beer, Wine, and Liquor Stores
Other Amusement and Recreation
7139-- Industries
Museums, Historical Sites, and Similar
712--Institutions
Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, and
711-Related Industries

*These exclude the NAICS codes included in the restaurant groups, i.e. 445299, 445291, 445120.
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Appendix C. Mean Treatment and Control Group Characteristics, Rollout Sample By Quarter
Jun – Aug, 2010
Treatment Control

Sept – Nov, 2010

Dec – Feb, 2011

Mar – May, 2011

Treatment Control

Treatment Control

Treatment Control

Characteristics:
Borough
Manhattan

39.6%

41.4%

40.3%

41.8%

41.5%

40.8%

41.6%

40.6%

Bronx

9.4

9.8

10.2

9.4

10.0

9.0

9.6

9.3

Brooklyn

24.8

22.8

23.2

22.6

22.9

22.6

22.9

22.0

Queens

25.4

21.8

23.2

21.8

22.2

22.7

22.2

23.5

Staten Island

0.9

4.2

3.1

4.4

3.4

4.9

3.7

4.5

15.6%

12.3%

13.6%

12.1%

13.8%

9.9%

13.5%

7.8%

5.9

7.3

6.8

7.5

7.0

7.5

7.2

6.6

Chain
Workers

Building:
Assessed Value

7,322,578

9,503,942 9,108,455

9,557,440 9,151,351

9,293,507 9,061,502

10,200,000
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Jun – Aug, 2010
Treatment Control

Sept – Nov, 2010

Dec – Feb, 2011

Mar – May, 2011

Treatment Control

Treatment Control

Treatment Control

Building Type
9.2%

8.0%
7.2%

Office/Commercial
34.7
Retail/Commercial
41.0

Other
Commercial

4.5

Residential

43.3

Government/Public

8.2

7.9

7.6%

4.7%

34.1

34.4

34.8

34.5

34.0

43.5

43.8

42.8

43.7

41.8

4.8

4.1

5.4

4.3

6.4

8.4

8.3

8.2

8.2

8.7

2.4

1.5

3.4

1.7

4.4

=1.08

F( 12, 937)

=0.71

F( 11, 937)

1.9
2.2

F( 12, 937)

5.6%

4.0

1.6

Joint Significance

42.7

4.5
9.0

8.0%

35.5
34.7

Mixed Retail

6.9%

=0.80

F( 12, 937)

=1.39
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Jun – Aug, 2010
Treatment Control

Prob > F

Sept – Nov, 2010

Dec – Feb, 2011

Mar – May, 2011

Treatment Control

Treatment Control

Treatment Control

= 0.6523 Prob > F

= 0.3779 Prob > F

=0.7279 Prob > F

=0.1738

Initial Insp. Score

23.5

24.3

26.0

22.9

25.0

21.8

24.1

22.6

Final Insp. Score

18.0

20.1

20.9

19.2

20.5

18.3

19.9

18.8

Fines per Quarter

$341

$250

$329

$202

$285

$175

$262

$170

N

1,560

17,326

7,597

11,118

13,098

5,755

16,514

2,717

N with Building
Code

1,082

12,122

5,364

7,817

9,333

4,000

11,742

1,858

Notes: Restaurants in the treatment group have their first graded inspection by the end of the fiscal quarter. Control group
restaurants do not have a graded inspection until after the quarter ends. Each observation is a restaurant-quarter.
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Appendix D. Regression Results, Impact on Inspection Scores and Fines by Quarter, Rollout
Sample
VARIABLES

Graded Inspection
In Quarter 1:
In Quarter 2:
In Quarter 3:
In Quarter 4:

Quarter Of Grading Policy
2
3
4

Restaurant FE
Constant

Initial
Inspection

Final
Inspection

Fines

1.897***
(0.677)
0.810***
(0.180)
-0.693***
(0.170)
-2.071***
(0.182)

-2.137***
(0.379)
-2.377***
(0.177)
-3.616***
(0.173)
-5.561***
(0.216)

153.759***
(21.950)
26.014
(17.981)
-147.830***
(20.183)
-275.079***
(18.357)

0.074
(0.052)
-0.133**
(0.063)
0.974***
(0.076)

1.243***
(0.072)
1.179***
(0.094)
3.409***
(0.151)

130.444***
(10.915)
251.674***
(19.331)
387.343***
(17.798)

Y

Y

Y

25.483***
(0.059)

19.736***
(0.067)

326.148***
(6.021)

Observations
122,886
93,451
94,752
R-squared
0.849
0.764
0.553
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by restaurant in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Impact estimates of graded inspections on initial inspection
scores, final inspection scores, and fines by quarter. Graded Inspection captures if
the most recent inspection occurs after the restaurant grade program begins in July
2010. Quarters Post * Graded is an interaction of the number of quarters after the
grading policy is implemented and share of a quarter a restaurant has been treated.
In Quarter 1, 2, 3, 4 are a vector of interactions between the quarter of observation
and share of quarter with a graded inspection. Sample includes all restaurants
continuously operating from the quarter before grading to five quarters following
grading.
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Appendix E. Composition of establishments, over time

Number of Establishment Groups by Quarter
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